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Wael B. Hallaq, Reforming Modernity: Ethics and the New Human in the Philosophy of 
Abdurrahman Taha. New York: Columbia University Press, 2019, 376 pp.
A short review cannot do justice to such an august book as it comes at the 
peak of the intellectual maturity of two of the most phenomenal Islamicists of 
our age. As such, Hallaq here is not just a translator of Taha (b. 1944), though 
translating Taha is never an easy job, but also an incredible interlocuter who 
critiques him on the basis of his own intellectual project that he has been de-
veloping throughout his academic career. On the other hand, the book coin-
cides a growing interest in Taha’s works in English as well as in Arabic due to 
the originality of his ideas and the novelty of his epistemological tools (see for 
instance, Kigar 2017, 5–33; Belhaj 2018, 24–43).1
Reforming Modernity consists of an introduction, six chapters, an epilogue 
and an appendix. In the introduction, Hallaq gives a thorough reading of 
the nineteenth and twentieth century Muslim engagement with modernist 
discourse, pointing out that Taha’s project ‘departs from, but leaves behind, 
the epistemological grounds in which the great majority of modern Muslim 
intellectuals have anchored their own programs of so-called reform’ (xi). The 
subsequent chapters read and analyze the major questions that occupied 
Taha’s ethical philosophy. Starting with the question of turāth, Hallaq eluci-
dates the theoretical and methodological approaches through which Taha cri-
tiqued contemporary Islamic thought, particularly emphasizing his critique 
on ‘imported knowledge’. According to Hallaq’s reading of Taha, contempo-
rary Arab-Islamic thought has mishandled the question of turāth as a result of 
‘its inability to carve for itself an autonomous epistemological venue’ (31). The 
subjects of Taha’s methodological assaults here are the reformists who, due to 
their imported methods, ‘no two of them could agree on the same conclusions 
with regard to the traditional text’ (42). Consequently, ‘issues are conflated and 
distinct forms of thought are carelessly assimilated’ (42). Taha then introduces 
the following principle: every foreign importation is questionable until its ben-
efit is verified through an indigenous avenue (36–37).
Hallaq thence shows that Taha attributes this mishandling to the ‘unques-
tioning dependence on a misconceived Western application of modernity’ (32). 
Hence, he introduces the notion of the ‘spirit of modernity’, as compared to its 
phenomenological reality.2 That is, Taha’s project problematizes the Western 
1   As for the Arabic literature, counting the works on Taha’s oeuvre extends beyond the narrow 
scope of this short review.
2   Apart from regarding the ‘spirit of modernity’ idea as problematic, Hallaq thinks that glimps-
es of it can also be found in the American constitutional theorists and various critics of the 
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project of modernity due to its ethical bankruptcy and offers solutions to its 
major pitfalls by differentiating between the multiple potentialities of moder-
nity and its singular Western actuality. Hallaq puts it this way:
[Taha] differentiating between two sides or aspects of the phenomenon: 
the spirit (rūḥ) of modernity, on the one hand, and its reality or real man-
ifestations (wāqiʿ), on the other (RH, 24). For Taha, the latter has thus far 
been characteristically Euro-American, while the former is the property 
of humanity in its entirety, since the sources of this spirit extend back to 
the history of all civilizations (79).
Taking ethics as the defining feature of the spirit of modernity, Hallaq illus-
trates the centrality of the Quran in the thought of Abdurrahman as a reser-
voir of ethics that has the potentials to transform existing Western application 
of modernity (31). He dwells upon Taha’s critique of the form and content 
of Enlightenment’s central concepts, particularly ‘rationalism, positive and 
negative liberties, the fact/value and Is/Ought distinctions’ (41). Further em-
phasizing that rationality, which is Enlightenment’s central pillar, is ‘culture-
specific’ (45).
Hallaq thereafter introduces Taha’s central theses that cover a wide range 
of interests, ranging from political theology and secularist discourse, to the 
core and essence of his ethical philosophy, represented in his understanding 
of the Quranic concept of trusteeship (amāna), which gives an original guide 
to the ‘new human’ (198) that Taha aims to develop. Taken altogether, Taha’s 
project promises to establish a new version of modernity that puts forward 
‘(a) corrections to Western modernity and (b) a healthier modus vivendi and 
modus operandi for living in the world, not above it’ (32).
In rescuing modernity’s spirit from its Western application, resorting to 
religion is inevitable. For any solution to the moral predicament of Western 
modernity must fulfill three conditions: (a) it has to come from outside the 
hubs of power upon which the modern system is based; otherwise, ‘the sys-
tem will subordinate it to its own imperatives, just as it routinely does in the 
case of countless institutes, conventions, and organizations that promote ethi-
cal content’; (b) it must rely on sources ‘superior to, and stronger than, the 
sources of the current system’; and (c) it ‘must rest on universal ethics so that 
Enlightenment who claimed that ‘the founding principles of such systems (U.S. Constitution 
or lofty Enlightenment ideas) have been violated in favour of a skewed application’ (82).
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it corresponds to the massive range of globalization and still meets its require-
ment of founding a single universal society’ (141).
‘Revealed religion’, argues Taha, it the only solution that meets the above 
requirements. Revealed Religion calls for ‘the unification of groups/peoples/
nations (aqwām, umam) and has given many of them a single culture’ (141). 
Indeed, the surge of voices that demand the revert to religion as a response to 
the predicaments of modernity attests to this fact. The question then, should 
every nation return to its ancestors’ religion, ‘extracting from it moral prin-
ciples to fight off the evils of globalization? Or should the learned leaders of 
all these groups/nations/peoples meet and discuss how they can deduce from 
their religions some principles they all agree on?’ (142). Taha’s answer is: if each 
group figures out their problems separately, the multitude of their moral sys-
tems will unquestionably lead to the failure of their dialogue. Furthermore, 
even if they agreed collectively on a common measure, that common measure 
will necessarily be minimal, ‘since everyone has to agree to it, with the conse-
quence that this weak agreement will not be sufficient to dislodge the force-
ful presence of the current globalization system’ (142). Therefore, a maximal 
moral content that can supply the means to prevail over the contemporary 
structure of globalization is a need.
Islam, Taha contends, can provide that maximal moral alternative. The 
evidence to this is what Taha calls ‘the evidence of moral time’. Islam, hav-
ing ‘come at a fairly late period in the human history of revelation, is the best 
equipped in terms of the moral and ethical arsenal because it gathers within it-
self the cumulative moral legacy of all that has come before it’ (142). Therefore, 
‘globalization as a cultural act’ takes place within Islam’s moral time. Hence, 
Islam, ‘is responsible for what is happening during its own time’, and that we 
are then ‘permitted to say that globalization is an Islamic reality’, although it 
was not produced by Muslims themselves (143).
Centralizing marginalized spirituality lies at the heart of Taha’s call to the 
Islamic alternative. He shifts the focus from the ‘ego’, which has been central-
ized by Western modernity, to the ‘spirit’, which is the centre of the Islamic 
ethical theory. The spirit ‘connects its owner to the Unseen world once he em-
barks on acts of purification and preservation of custodial rights’ (205). On the 
contrary, the ego (anā) ascribes things in the world to their immediate doer.3 
3   Although this transcendental theory is commonly limited to religionists, to Taha, it includes 
‘all that which the human being cannot see directly or immediately with his own eyes, 
whether he had seen it before but can no longer see it, or whether he never saw it but will see 
it in a future time’ (206).
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Although Western modernity has disconnected the two worlds, it could not get 
rid of one quality, which is: majesty ( jalāla). It has appropriated it by renaming 
it ‘sovereignty (siyāda) as a way of masking its transcendental origins’ (207). 
It has doggedly adhered to it, going so far as to ‘attribute institutions, peo-
ples, and individuals to it’, and all this is performed under the delusion that 
man, replacing God, ‘can command the affairs of the world’. This misplaced 
sovereignty ‘has made man master and god, even a self- worshiper’. Due to 
this ‘self-divination’ man has become tyrant and despotic without seeing 
it (207). ‘Self-divination’ in turn led to a sense of ownership from the part 
of man (254).
By contrast, God in Islam is the one who truly owns everything. That is, 
Man owns things in the world only derivatively, metaphorically and tenta-
tively (254). Hence, Islam introduces the concept of Trusteeship, which re-
flects a relationship between three elements: the thing making up the trust, 
the subject that entrusts (God), and the entrusted (man). God puts in the 
hands of man a thing for the purposes of maintenance and care. However, God 
is still the real owner of that thing, for He also owns the trustee. Therefore, 
Man cannot own anything in the full sense of the term. This Trusteeship com-
prises two forms: maintenance and care (ṣiyāna and riʿāya). Maintenance 
means the conservation of the trust as it was given, trying Man’s hardest 
to avert any harm afflicting it. As for Care, it implies a set of principles that 
must be observed. Namely, within the notion of Care there is the presump-
tion of the human use of the trust. Man is given permission to that usage pre-
cisely because the rules of Care are in place. Concurrently, these principles 
are the conditions of possibility for ‘ownership’ and use of the trust with the 
understanding that ‘whatever use is made of the trust—and man has a wide 
range of freedoms—the rights of the divine truster must be fully observed’ 
(254–255).
Hallaq’s contribution to scholarship is a two birds, one stone achievement. 
Not only does Hallaq introduce to the English reader an accomplished philoso-
pher who would hardly be known if not translated precisely and meticulously, 
but also opens a new door for his own philosophical project. Put differently, 
Hallaq’s Impossible State (2013), which is his most controversial as well as most 
influential treatise, left his readers wandering and wondering, offering a com-
pelling deconstruction to the idea of an Islamic state, but lacking and looking 
for an alternative. The introduction of Taha’s project may contribute to the ful-
filment of that need.
A couple of questions need to be asked, however. First, why did Hallaq 
exclude/overlook Taha’s latest work, i.e., Thughūr al-Murābaṭa (2018)? While 
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such a book was expected to be of high relevance to Hallaq’s study as it can 
be regarded as an application of Taha’s call to shift from theoretical reason to 
practical reason,4 Hallaq never even mentions the book! Second, if Hallaq does 
not see eye to eye with Taha about the multiplicity of modernity and hence 
the possibility of an Islamic modernity, what and how does his project gain 
of introducing Taha’s? Put differently, given the different trajectories the two 
thinkers have travelled, the question that needs to be further investigated is: 
how does Taha contribute to Hallaq’s project of anti-modernism?
Strange as it may seem, Taha’s proposal of an Islamic modernity brings him 
closer to Muḥammad ʿAbduh’s (d. 1905) domain and takes him further from 
the anti-modernistic discourse. That is to say that Hallaq’s claim that Taha 
leaves behind the epistemological grounds upon which ʿAbduh anchored his 
programme of reform can be challenged. The roots of Taha’s ethical project 
can be traced back to the reformist seeds planted by ʿAbduh. For instance, 
Taha’s theology of progress (217) is largely present in ʿAbduh’s Theology of Unity 
(ʿAbduh 1966, 132–142). Furthermore, Taha’s idea of the spirit of modernity can 
be found in ʿAbduh, which Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935) described as leading to: ‘virtu-
ous modernity’ (Riḍā 2006, ك). Although ʿAbduh has often been labelled as an 
‘adaptationist’, as opposed to Taha who is largely seen as an original philoso-
pher, the author of this review maintains that ʿAbduh’s thought has only been 
studied from the view of influence and adaptation rather than convergence 
and originality.5 Namely, the possibility that ʿAbduh had reached those ideas 
independently from Western thought is a plausible argument if ʿAbduh is stud-
ied irrespective of the dialectics of reactionism and the unproven claims of 
Westernization.
Be that as it may, Reforming Modernity is another great success of Hallaq. 
Indeed, if Hallaq is indebted to Taha having given new blood to his philosophi-
cal project, Taha ought to be indebted to Hallaq having widened his readership 
by introducing him accurately to the English audience.
Mohammed Gamal Abdelnour
SOAS, University of London and al-Azhar University, Cairo
mm161@soas.ac.uk
4   One of Taha’s central critiques against Western modernity is its emphasis on theory over 
praxis (39).
5   See Ammeke Kateman’s recent thorough study on ʿAbduh, Muḥammad ʿAbduh and His 
Interlocutors: Conceptualizing Religion in a Globalizing World (Kateman 2019). See also, Haj 
2009.
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